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REORGANIZING IN THE WAKE OF MISSION
PROD. HOLDINGS V. TEMPNOLOGY: HOW TO
ADDRESS THE TRADEMARK AND BANKRUPTCY
LAW ISSUES CREATED BY THE SUPREME
COURT’S RECENT DECISION
Kayla N. Ghasemi *
Bankruptcy law seeks to provide a “fresh start” for debtors and an equitable distribution of funds to creditors. Trademark law, on the other hand,
aims to ensure proper source identification and protect the public from deception. These policies converge when a trademark owner or licensor has
licensed use of the mark to others and hopes to reject this licensing agreement in bankruptcy. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mission Prod.
Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, there was a circuit split regarding the licensee’s rights upon the bankruptcy of and rejection by the licensor. Some circuits held that the licensee’s rights terminated upon rejection, while others
held that the rights continued.
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved these conflicting positions and
held that rejection of a trademark license operates as a breach under applicable state law, which allows the licensee’s rights to survive the bankruptcy.
While this result seems fair for the licensee who may rely on use of the mark
to keep its business afloat, there are certain bankruptcy and trademark issues
that may arise such as increased difficulty in reorganization for the licensor,
as well as the possibility of naked licensing and abandonment. This Comment explores these potential legal implications, considers legislative
amendment, and suggests that practitioners draft contracts accordingly to
help manage possible risks created by the Mission decision.
J.D. Candidate, 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author wishes to acknowledge insights from her faculty advisor, Jennifer Rothman, Professor of Law at LMU Loyola Law School
in Los Angeles, who inspired the topic and provided a valuable perspective on trademark law, and
the writing process overall. The author would also like to acknowledge her friend, Bradford Barnhardt, for his thoughtful contribution and perspective on bankruptcy law, as well as the Loyola
Entertainment Law Review staffers and editors for their hard work.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Mission Prod. Holdings v.
Tempnology, LLC (“Mission”) answered a long-debated question regarding
the fate of trademark licenses when a licensor files for bankruptcy, but it also
created a number of questions in the areas of intellectual property and bankruptcy law that reorganizing licensors will have to grapple with for years to
come. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mission, some circuits held
that the licensee’s rights to use the trademark were extinguished upon the
filing of bankruptcy by the licensor, 1 while other circuits held the opposite,
concluding that a licensee’s rights continued beyond the bankruptcy of the
licensor. 2
In Mission, the Supreme Court resolved this circuit split, holding that a
debtor’s express rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy could not
unilaterally deprive the licensee of its rights to use the trademark. 3 While
the decision may seem like a win for trademark licensees, it was decided
solely on the basis of bankruptcy law and not trademark law. 4 This Comment will delve into the questions left open by Mission. For instance, under
bankruptcy law, the decision could make it more difficult for trademark licensors to restructure. Specifically, reorganizing debtors in bankruptcy must
propose a feasible Chapter 11 plan that outlines the manner in which creditors will be repaid. To receive a discharge—that is, to no longer remain
liable on pre-bankruptcy debts—the debtor’s creditors must vote to approve
the plan. If the debtor is forced to expend scarce resources to maintain a
trademark, it will have less money to allocate to its creditors, making creditors less likely to vote in favor of the plan. The Mission decision therefore
implicates a core policy of the bankruptcy system.
Additionally, under trademark law, there is a potential for consumer
confusion as to who is standing behind a product, and trademark rights themselves could be extinguished as a result of a lack of supervision by the debtorlicensor of the licensee’s products. The failure to supervise the products and

1. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
2. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012).
3. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1666 (2019).
4. Id. at 1657.
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services of a licensee can result in what is called “naked licensing,” and lead
to a determination that a mark has been abandoned by the licensor. 5
Practitioners will need to be cognizant of and address these issues in
licensing agreements going forward since they will continue to raise unsettled questions in the context of bankruptcy. Alternatively, Congress could
ameliorate some of the challenges created by Mission by amending the
United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”) or the Lanham Act.
This Comment will propose several approaches to address these issues. In
Part II, this Comment provides the foundational aspects of trademark and
bankruptcy law that inform the Mission decision and the current challenges.
Part III describes the circuit split that set up the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mission and analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in the case. Part IV considers the implications of the decision, including some unresolved questions
and potentially negative consequences. Finally, Part V considers potential
legislative solutions and proposes ways in which thoughtful contract drafting
and negotiation could avoid possible pitfalls created by the Mission decision.

II. BACKGROUND OF LAW
In bankruptcy, a corporate debtor who has over-extended itself to creditors must either choose to dissolve or reorganize and create a payment plan
to repay its creditors. 6 A bankruptcy debtor must also decide what to do with
its existing contractual obligations. 7 It may “assume” a contract and remain
bound by its obligations, or it may “reject” a contract and be released of its
obligations. 8 The rejection of an executory contract—a contract where there
is performance due on both sides, such as a trademark-licensing agreement—
operates as a breach of contract. 9 This portion of the Comment discusses the
relevant areas of law.
5. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.04 (2020).
6. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2020); Process - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/BXJ9-9NNM].
7. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018); see also Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy - Assumption and
Rejection, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/civil-resource-manual-60-executorycontracts-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/8KZE-JHRE].
9. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395–96 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
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A. Trademark Licensing
Owners of trademarks often grant licenses for use of their marks in exchange for royalties. 10 This is done through a licensing agreement in which
the trademark owner, or licensor, grants another, the licensee, the right to use
the mark “for the purposes specified in the license agreement.” 11 The licensing agreement also “protects the licensee from an infringement suit by the
licensor for such use.” 12 Additionally, a trademark license may be exclusive
or non-exclusive. 13 An exclusive license grants rights to use a mark to only
one licensee, while a nonexclusive license agreement may grant that right to
others, including the licensor, allowing others to use the mark contemporaneously. 14 The memorialization of such an agreement protects the licensor
in the event of a dispute and sets forth terms which specify what the licensee
may and may not do with the mark. 15
A cornerstone of the trademark licensing agreement is “[c]ontrol over
the nature and quality” of the goods. 16 Accordingly, licensing agreements
typically set forth quality control obligations, which require that both the licensor and licensee maintain the quality and value of the mark to prevent
derogation or dilution and requires that they maintain the mark as an indicator of source and sponsorship. 17
10. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., MODULE 12: TRADEMARK LICENSING, https://
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/ip_panorama_12_learning_points.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST7V-RZTB].
11. Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Property and Technology from the Financially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to Minimize the
Risk in A Licensee’s Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 BUS. LAW. 1649, 1658
(2000).
12. Id. at 1658–69.
13. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.07 (2020).
14. 2 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.08 (2020); 2
ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.34 (2020).
15. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07.
16. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04; see generally Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v.
Tyfield Imps., 289 F.3d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 2002); FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626
F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2010).
17. Bach v. Forever Living Prod. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120–22 (W.D. Wash.
2007); GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07.
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While it is not mandatory to have a provision in the contract setting
forth quality control, a licensor must supervise the quality and production of
products or provision of services under the owner’s mark. 18 In the absence
of such oversight, a license may become “naked” as a result of the lack of “a
meaningful assurance of quality.” 19 Despite the evocative terminology, the
term “naked licensing” indicates that the licensor is not supervising the manner in which the licensee is using the mark nor whether the products or services are similar to or of equal quality to its own. 20 Naked licensing of a
mark may also occur “when a licensor allows a licensee to use the mark on
any quality or type of good that the licensee chooses.” 21
Failure to provide such supervision indicates that the mark no longer
functions as a source-identifier and has become unmoored from its underlying product or service. 22 As such, under section 45 of the Lanham Act, naked
licensing constitutes abandonment, and consequently causes a forfeiture of
the rights to the mark. 23
The policy behind this law is to protect the public from being deceived. 24 In the absence of supervision, the public could be deceived due to
potential misrepresentation as to the connection between the goods or services and their source, regardless of quality level. 25 The public may also

18. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A license agreement need not contain an express quality control provision because trademark law, rather than the
contract itself, confers on the licensor the right and obligation to exercise quality control.”) (emphasis added).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 (AM. L. INST. 1995); Bach, 473
F. Supp. 2d at 1120; Barcamerica, 289 F.3d at 596.
20. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04.
21. Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
licensor lost its rights to a trademark when granting the licensee the uncontrolled right to use the
mark in conjunction with any and all goods the licensee manufactured); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:38 (5th ed. 2020).
22. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018) (stating that a mark will be deemed to be abandoned “[w]hen
any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the
mark . . . to lose its significance as a mark”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04.
24. See GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04.
25. Id.; Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (In
the absence of supervision, “the risk that the public will be unwittingly deceived will be increased
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likely be confused as to whether the licensor truly endorses the products that
consumers might purchase from the licensee. 26
Naked licensing “erodes the significance of the designation as an accurate indication of origin: a trademark,” 27 which is rooted in the rationale that
the “public has a right to expect consistent quality of goods or services associated with the trademark.” 28 Accordingly, a trademark holder that licenses
its mark must protect that quality or risk losing rights to that mark. 29 While
there is no bright-line rule regarding the level of control necessary to prevent
abandonment, courts have considered “whether the [licensor] (1) retained
express contractual control over the [licensee’s] quality control measures,
(2) had actual controls over the quality control measures, and (3) was unreasonable in relying on the quality control measures.” 30
Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc. illustrates the need
for actual quality control, especially in the absence of a contractual obligation to do so. 31 In 1988 and 1989, Barcamerica, owner of the Leonardo Da
Vinci mark, entered into licensing agreements with Renaissance Vineyards
(“Renaissance”) for use of its Leonardo Da Vinci mark on Renaissance’s
wine products in the United States. 32 These agreements did not contain a
provision setting forth quality control obligations. 33
Competitor Cantine Leonardo Da Vinci Soc. Coop. a.r.l. (“Cantine”),
a producer of wine in Vinci, Italy, also sold wine products which bore the
. . . [and] the only effective way to protect the public . . . is to place on the licensor the affirmative
duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”).
26. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 6.04.
27. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 18:48 (5th ed. 2020).
28. Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).
29. Lanham (Trademark) Act of 1964 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2018).
30. Lawn Managers, Inc. v. Progressive Lawn Managers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 975, 976
(E.D. Mo. 2018); 15 U.S.C. § 1064; FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 512
(9th Cir. 2010).
31. See generally Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., 289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2002).
32. Id. at 592.
33. Id.
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same Leonardo Da Vinci mark since 1972, and has sold its wine American
importers since 1979. 34 In 1996, Tyfield Importers, Inc. (“Tyfield”) became
the “exclusive United States importer and distributor of Cantine wine products bearing the ‘Leonardo Da Vinci’ mark.” 35 Cantine became aware of
Barcamerica’s registration of the same mark when it was in the process of
“prosecuting its first trademark application in the United States.” 36 Cantine
determined that Barcamerica was no longer selling wine products with the
marks, and sought to have the mark declared abandoned and therefore cancelled in an action with the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). 37 Barcamerica moved to suspend the cancellation proceeding, and the PTO
granted the motion. 38 Barcamerica then moved for a preliminary injunction
to prevent Cantine and Tyfield from continued use of the “Leonardo Da
Vinci” mark. 39 The district court denied the motion on the grounds that there
was a “serious question as to whether [Barcamerica] will be able to . . . overcome [the] claim of abandonment.” 40 Barcamerica then appealed. 41
On appeal, Barcamerica argued that even though there was a lack of
supervision over the mark, it was not considered a naked license because
Renaissance made objectively “good wine,” and therefore the public was not
deceived. 42 To support this argument Barcamerica relied on the testimony
of its principal, George Gino Barca, stating that he “occasionally [and] informally tasted . . . the [Renaissance] wine” and that he relied on the reputation of a “world-famous winemaker” employed by Renaissance at the time
the agreements were signed. 43
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 593.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 597.
43. Id. at 592.
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However, the court held that whether the wine was good or bad was
irrelevant to the determination of whether the license had become “naked”
and therefore abandoned. 44 The court concluded that Barcamerica and Renaissance lacked “the type of close working relationship required to establish
adequate quality control in the absence of a formal agreement.” 45 The court
held that “[b]oth the terms of the licensing agreements and the manner in
which they were carried out show that [Barcamerica] engaged in naked licensing of the ‘Leonardo Da Vinci’ mark.” 46 Further, the court held that “it
is well established that where a trademark owner engages in naked licensing,
without any control over the quality of goods produced by the licensee, such
a practice is inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights
to the trademark by the licensor.” 47
There are, however, instances where courts have found adequate quality control without the involvement of the licensor. 48 Where there is a “special relationship between the parties, such as a familial relationship or a long
period of close business association[,]” courts have held that licensors were
justified in relying on licensees for quality control. 49 For example, courts
have found that a special relationship existed where the licensor and licensee
were commonly owned, and where “family members . . . cooperated in
44. Id. at 597–98.
45. Id. at 597; See, e.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1122
(5th Cir. 1991) (The licensor and licensee were engaged in a close working relationship for eight
years); Transgo, Inc. v. AJAC Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (9th Cir.
1985) (The licensor was the manufacturer of 90% of the components sold by the licensee and had
a ten year working relationship); Taffy Original Designs, Inc. v. Taffy’s, Inc., No. 65C345, 1966
WL 7124, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (The licensor and licensee were sisters and in business together for
seventeen years, licensee’s company was a continuation of the sisters’ prior company, and the licensor occasionally visited the licensee’s store and was satisfied with the quality of the merchandise
offered); Arner v. Sharper Image Corp., No. CV94-1713 ABC (BOR), 1995 WL 873730, at *5
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (The licensor enjoyed a close working relationship with its licensee’s employees
and the license agreement provided that the license would terminate if certain employees ceased to
be affiliated with licensee).
46. Barcamerica, 289 F.3d at 597.
47. Id. at 598 (citing First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19426,
16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).
48. Edward K. Esping, Annotation, Granting of “Naked” or Unsupervised License to Third
Party as Abandonment of Trademark, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 211 (1994).
49. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 18:57 (5th ed. 2020).
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running related businesses[,]” among other scenarios. 50 This seems to indicate that in the event of a bankruptcy and lack of supervision by a debtorlicensor, it is possible that the mark will not be forfeited so long as the licensor-licensee relationship is of the kind that courts recognize as establishing
adequate quality control, and the licensee maintains the original quality of
the mark.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, in Monster, Inc. v. Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corp. (“Monster, Inc.”), the court held that naked licensing, and therefore abandonment, did not occur because the licensor exercised
proper quality control. 51 In Monster, Inc., Plaintiff-Licensee Monster, Inc.
(“Monster”) sought “judicial declaration that the Monster Headphone Mark
[did] not infringe any trademark rights of [Defendant-Licensor] Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation (‘Dolby’) in its Dolby Headphone
Mark.” 52 Dolby then filed a counterclaim against Monster alleging trademark infringement to which Monster responded with a claim that Dolby engaged in naked licensing. 53 Dolby argued that Monster was “estopped from
claiming naked licensing based upon a failure to police the quality of Monster’s use of the trademark[]” because a licensee is precluded from “challenging the validity of the licensor’s trademark based upon conduct that occurred during the life of its license, particularly with respect to the licensee
itself.” 54 The court found that, “[a]ssuming Monster may nevertheless challenge the validity of the trademark based upon evidence of Dolby’s failure
to police others’ use of the mark,” there was adequate quality control by licensor Dolby, and therefore, naked licensing did not occur. 55 The court in
50. Id.; Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir. 2006),
as amended, (May 5, 2006) (“[L]itigants were closely-held business entities owned and managed
by family members and which included a high degree of interlocking ownership and control[,]”
and therefore enjoyed a “special relationship.”).
2013).

51. Monster, Inc. v. Dolby Labs. Licensing Corp., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078 (N.D. Cal.
52. Id. at 1070.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 1076–77; see also Pac. Supply Coop. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 318 F.2d
894, 908 (9th Cir. 1963); STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., No. C 96–1140 FMS, 1997 WL 337578 at
*10 (N.D.Cal. June 5, 1997); Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); Prof’l
Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1975).
55. Monster, Inc., 920 F. Supp 2d at 1077.
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Monster, Inc. noted that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has not settled on an exact
standard of proof required for establishing a naked licensing claim,” but because the theory “is essentially one of forfeiture of trademark rights,” the
standard has been described as “stringent.” 56
In Monster, Inc., Dolby required its licensee Monster “to abide by its
guidelines for use of the mark and use of the Dolby headphone technology.” 57 As a precondition to use of the mark, Dolby also required its licensees to send “prototype products for testing to ensure” that quality standards
were met. 58 Additionally, Dolby “require[d] licensees to abide by certain
guidelines for its use and display” of the trademark. 59 Dolby also employed
a monitoring software which would identify “similar, potentially confusing
marks[] in the marketplace[,] . . . a compliance team in the field, evaluation
of customer reports, and partner[ed] with customs officials[]” to police the
mark. 60 Further, Dolby “engage[d] in enforcement efforts” if unauthorized
or infringing uses were found. 61 While there were lapses in Dolby’s policing
of the mark and quality, these lapses did not meet the stringent standard required by the naked licensing doctrine. 62 Accordingly the court found that
Dolby exercised proper quality control and therefore naked licensing could
not exist. 63
This legal framework presents a problem when it comes to bankruptcy
because a restructuring licensor will likely be unable to engage in quality
control due to its limited resources. Although the level of quality control a
licensor needs will depend on the product and license at issue, 64 quality
56. Id. at 1076 (citing FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d 509, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2010).
57. Monster, Inc., 920 F. Supp 2d at 1077.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1078.
64. See Theodore Chiacchio, Top Tips for Maintaining Adequate Quality Control Over
Trademark Licensees, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/12/02
/top-tips-maintaining-adequate-quality-control-trademark-licensees/id=116485/ [https://perma.cc
/D3Y5-CFC7] (“A determination as to whether or not a trademark owner/licensor maintains
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control can be expensive. 65 For a debtor-licensor with scarce resources,
costly quality control might not be possible. Likewise, a liquidating licensor
will not be able to exercise quality control because it will have to sell off its
assets as part of the bankruptcy estate. 66 Because the mark must be sold
along with the goods or services attached to it, a purchaser of the assets at
auction must maintain quality control or risk abandonment. 67 As this Comment later proposes, this issue may be resolved by contract or by amendment
of the Lanham Act.

B. A Background of Bankruptcy Law and its Intersection with
Intellectual Property Law
Bankruptcy aims to provide debtors with a fresh start and to distribute
funds equitably to creditors. 68 In a 1934 decision, the Supreme Court stated
that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to give “the honest but unfortunate
debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.” 69 This is
accomplished through the discharge of burdensome debts of the debtor. 70
Upon the filing of bankruptcy, a separate legal entity called the bankruptcy estate is created. 71 A bankruptcy estate is comprised of “the debtor’s
assets at the moment of filing, as well as the proceeds of such property and

sufficient control over a licensee’s products or services is a fact-intensive analysis determined on a
case-by-case basis.”).
65. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1665 (2019) (Although this argument was raised by the losing party, the Supreme Court noted it and did not seem
to reject it).
66. Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms
/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/QL4D-3XL7].
67. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07.
68. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 6 (2020); Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.
69. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
70. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2018).

GHASEMI_MACROS_V5 (DO NOT DELETE)

50

1/5/2021 12:00 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

any additional property interests the estate may acquire later.” 72 Next, a
mechanism called an “automatic stay” is instated to prevent any action
against the debtor or property and to “preserve the bankruptcy estate until all
of the debtor’s assets can be collected and its creditors brought together to
adjudicate their rights in the estate.” 73
A corporate entity can file bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. 74 When a company files for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, its assets are liquidated at auction, funds
are distributed to creditors, and the company ceases to exist. 75 Chapter 11,
by contrast, envisions a reorganization process where the existence of the
debtor survives. 76 Upon the filing of bankruptcy, the debtor becomes a
“debtor in possession,” and the debtor’s business and management remain in
place. 77 In a Chapter 11 case, the debtor will generally repay its creditors
with allocations of its income over time. 78 “In order to best maximize the
value of the estate, the debtor in possession may be forced to breach contracts
that, at the time of bankruptcy, are economically inefficient.” 79 Section
365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee “may assume or reject
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.” 80 While the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “executory contract,” it is generally

72. Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 752 (2007).
73. Id.
74. See Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66.
75. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6; see Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra
note 66.
76. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.
77. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms
/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/URH4-F4SQ].
78. Id.
79. Clayton A. Smith, Comment, It’s Not You, It’s Us: Assessing the Contribution of Trademark Goodwill to Properly Balance the Results of Trademark License Rejection, 35 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 267, 271 (2019); see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01, supra note 6.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018).
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considered to be a contract “on which performance is due to some extent on
both sides.” 81
Rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach. 82 One type of
executory contract is a trademark license agreement to the extent that there
is performance due on both sides. 83 Such a license grants “one party the right
to use another party’s mark (i.e., to engage in otherwise infringing activity)
in a specified manner, generally in exchange for a royalty or other payment.” 84 Because a trademark license is only valid if “the licensor exercises
control over the nature and quality of the goods and/or services sold by the
licensee under the licensed mark[,]” issues of naked licensing, and therefore
abandonment, arise in the context of bankruptcy of the licensors. 85 The implications of a breach of an executory contract, specifically a trademark license agreement, were discussed in Mission, and will be explained in depth
in the next section.
For a Chapter 7 debtor, the survival of a trademark, if at all, will not
exist with the original owner. 86 The debtor’s assets, including its intellectual
property portfolio, will be sold at a bankruptcy auction, the debtor will be
wound up (i.e., voluntarily dissolved), and will cease to exist. 87 A trademark
cannot be sold “in gross,” meaning separate from the underlying goods or
services. 88 The mark must be sold along with, or appurtenant to, the goods

81. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 395-96 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019); see In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330
F.3d 36, 40 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (“[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease . . . immediately before the date of the filing of
the petition . . .”).
83. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 395–96.
84. 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 20:54 (4th ed. 2019).
85. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 18:38.
86. Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66.
87. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1903(a) (West 2020) (using “voluntary dissolution” and “winding
up the corporation” synonymously); Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (2018).
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or services associated with it. 89 A purchaser at a bankruptcy auction could
buy the entire company including the trademark(s) and then maintain quality
control so as to avoid abandonment. Alternatively, a purchaser could buy a
segment of the company along with only certain marks pertaining to that
segment and maintain quality control.
For example, if Starbucks were to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, one
could purchase the entire company and continue its predecessor’s operations
in a similar line of business while engaging in quality control. Alternatively,
it could purchase only the coffee beans segment or the retail store segment
and maintain similar quality so that the licensee’s rights do not terminate. If
the business or assets associated with a trademark were not purchased at auction, or if quality control was not maintained, the mark would evaporate.
For a Chapter 11 debtor, however, the survival of a trademark license
could have a significant impact on its ability to successfully reorganize because the approval of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan rests with the creditors of the debtor. To receive a discharge under Chapter 11, the debtor must
propose a plan of reorganization that outlines how the debtor will repay its
creditors. 90 The debtor’s creditors will then vote on this plan. 91 If the plan
does not propose to pay the creditors enough, the creditors will presumably
vote against it, however the court has the discretion to approve the plan notwithstanding. 92 Notably, a Chapter 11 debtor cannot receive a discharge of
its prebankruptcy liabilities without a plan approval. 93 In other words, for a
Chapter 11 debtor to receive its fresh start, its creditors, or the court, must
approve its plan of reorganization based on the voting requirements set forth
in Chapter 11 of the United States Code section 1129. In certain cases, approval may be unlikely if the debtor is required to use its limited funds to
maintain the quality of a trademark because the cost of quality control varies
depending on the nature of the mark. 94 Once the Chapter 11 debtor’s plan is
approved, it must still make its payments under the plan, or else risk

89. Id.
90. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.
91. Id.
92. See Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.
93. Id.
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2018).
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dismissal of its bankruptcy case or conversion to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 95
This potential outcome is in direct contravention of the fresh start for deserving debtors.

C. Lubrizol Enters
The court in Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.
(“Lubrizol”) was the first to decide the effect of rejection of an intellectual
property license, specifically a patent, after the licensor filed for bankruptcy. 96 In Lubrizol, Richmond Metal Finishers (“RMF”), a debtor-licensor, entered into a technology licensing agreement with Lubrizol granting a
nonexclusive patent license to use a “metal coating process technology.” 97
Over a year later, RMF filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought to reject
the license agreement. 98 The Fourth Circuit indicated that the licensing
agreement was executory as to each party and was executory under Title 11
of United States Code, § 365(a). 99 The court held that “Lubrizol would be
entitled to treat rejection as a breach and seek money damages,” but stated it
could not retain its rights under the original licensing agreement by continuing to use the technology. 100 Specifically, the court reasoned:
Even though § 365(g) treats rejection as breach, the legislative
history of § 365(g) makes clear that the purpose of the provision
is to provide only a damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party
. . . [T]he statutory ‘breach’ contemplated by § 365(g) controls,
and provides only a money damages remedy for the non-bankrupt

95. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(N) (listing “material default” under a confirmed Chapter 11
plan as sufficient “cause” for dismissal or conversion).
96. See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1044–45
(4th Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 1045.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id at 1048.
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party. Allowing specific performance would obviously undercut
the core purpose of rejection under § 365(a)[.] 101
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a “rejection of an intellectual
property license deprived the licensee of all rights previously granted under
the license.” 102 Congress enacted § 365(n) to, in effect, overrule the decision
in Lubrizol. 103 Section 365(n) allows a licensee of “intellectual property” to
“retain certain rights under the contract,” notwithstanding rejection by the
debtor-licensor. 104 Section 365(n) specifically provides:
(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the
debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may elect–(A) to treat such contract as
terminated by such rejection . . . or (B) to retain its rights . . . under such contract . . . to such intellectual property . . . as such
rights existed immediately before the case commenced . . . (2) If
the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph
(1)(B) of this subsection, under such contract–(A) the trustee
shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights; (B) the licensee
shall make all royalty payments due under such contract for the
duration of such contract and for any period described in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends
such contract . . . . 105
The Senate Report asserts that the purpose of the enactment of § 365(n) was
“to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the
licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of
the license pursuant to § 365 in the event of the licensor’s bankruptcy.” 106
While § 365(n) protects licensees of intellectual property, the term “intellectual property” as used in the Bankruptcy Code does not include
101. Id.
102. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 816 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).
103. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).
104. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. at 816 (rev’d on other grounds).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
106. S. REP. NO. 100–505, at 1 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02.
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trademarks. 107 Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines intellectual property. 108 It provides:
The term “intellectual property” means—(A) trade secret; (B)
invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35 [relating to patents]; (C) patent application; (D) plant variety; (E)
work of authorship protected under title 17 [relating to copyrights]; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17
[relating to microchips]; to the extent protected by applicable
nonbankruptcy law. 109
The silence of section 101(35A) on trademarks left room for debate as to
what to do with trademark licenses upon rejection, which was seemingly resolved by Mission. 110 However, the decision was based in bankruptcy law
and did not consider the impact in trademark law and potential policy violations. 111 While some legal scholars have argued that the statute should be
amended to incorporate “trademarks into the definition of intellectual property in 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(35A),” to “create uniformity for all areas of intellectual property,” 112 trademarks are different from patents and copyrights in
many respects, underscoring the importance for dissimilar treatment. 113 One
of the most notable differences is that trademarks are not separable from the
underlying business, whereas with patents and copyrights, this is not the
case. 114 Therefore, it is reasonable to treat trademarks differently from other
types of intellectual property and not apply a uniform rule to all.
107. In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 818–19.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A).
109. Id.
110. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (2019).
111. Id.
112. Victoria Elizabeth Jaworowski, Note, Stop the Silence: Why Bankruptcy Law Needs
to Include Protection for Trademarks, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 365, 377 (2019).
113. See generally Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-orcopyright [https://perma.cc/9XT3-JJJG].
114. Id.
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III. THE SPLIT
Before the Supreme Court answered the question regarding what to do
with trademark licenses upon bankruptcy rejection, a circuit split developed. 115 In Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing LLC
(“Sunbeam”), the Seventh Circuit held that rejection of a trademark license
agreement during a bankruptcy did not terminate the licensee’s rights to use
the trademark. 116 In contrast, in Mission, the First Circuit held that rejection
of a trademark license did terminate the licensee’s rights to use the trademark. 117

A. Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing LLC
In Sunbeam, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit rejected Lubrizol by holding that “rejection did not terminate the licensee’s rights to use
the trademarks.” 118 Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Company
(“Lakewood”), a box fan manufacturer, entered into a licensing agreement
with Chicago American Manufacturing LLC (“CAM”), granting CAM the
right to use Lakewood’s trademarks on its own production of box fans. 119
Under the contract, Lakewood was required “to provide CAM with motors
and cord sets (CAM was to build the rest of the fan) and to pay for the completed fans that CAM drop-shipped to retailers.” 120 When Lakewood began
to struggle, “several of [its] creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition
against it” under Chapter 7. 121
115. Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012);
In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
116. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 377.
117. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 392.
118. Robert L. Eisenbach, Throwing Shade at Sunbeam: Following Lubrizol and Not the
Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit Leaves Another Trademark Licensee Rejected and out of Luck,
COOLEY: IN THE (RED) (Jan. 22, 2018), https://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2018/01/articles/businessbankruptcy-issues/throwing-shade-sunbeam-following-lubrizol-not-seventh-circuit-first-circuitleaves-another-trademark-licensee-rejected-luck/ [https://perma.cc/X4DQ-QF5U].
119. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 374.
120. Id. at 376.
121. Id. at 374; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 301 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2020); 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 15.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2020) (An involuntary petition occurs where a third-party holder of a claim petitions
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The trustee sold Lakewood’s business at a bankruptcy auction and Sunbeam bought the business, including Lakewood’s trademarks. 122 However,
the Chapter 7 trustee rejected the executory portion of the CAM contract. 123
CAM nonetheless continued to make and sell Lakewood-branded fans. 124
Sunbeam then filed an adversary action against CAM and argued “that CAM
had to stop making and selling fans once Lakewood stopped having requirements for them.” 125 The bankruptcy court held that the Chapter 7 trustee’s
rejection of the trademark licensing agreement did not terminate the licensee’s right to continue using the mark, deciding on policy grounds that a
licensor should not be able to “take back trademark rights it bargained
away.” 126 Sunbeam appealed. 127
In rejecting the Lubrizol holding, the Seventh Circuit looked to what
would have happened outside of bankruptcy in the event of a licensor’s
breach of contract. 128 The Seventh Circuit stated that “[o]utside of bankruptcy, a licensor’s breach does not terminate a licensee’s right to use intellectual property.” 129 To support its holding, the Seventh Circuit provided the
following hypothetical:
Suppose that, before the bankruptcy began, Lakewood had broken
its promise by failing to provide the motors. CAM might have
elected to treat that breach as ending its own obligations, . . . but
it also could have covered in the market by purchasing motors and
for the bankruptcy of the debtor, whereas a voluntary petition is where a debtor files for bankruptcy).
122. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 374.
123. Id.; see also Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66. (“[A] trustee gathers and
sells the debtor’s nonexempt assets and uses the proceeds of such assets to pay holders of claims
(creditors) in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
124. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 374.
125. Id. at 375.
126. In re Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 459 B.R. 306, 343–46 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
127. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 375.
128. Id. at 376.
129. Id.
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billed Lakewood for the extra cost. CAM had bargained for the
security of being able to sell Lakewood-branded fans for its own
account if Lakewood defaulted; outside of bankruptcy, Lakewood
could not have ended CAM’s right to sell the box fans by failing
to perform its own duties, any more than a borrower could end
the lender’s right to collect just by declaring that the debt will not
be paid. 130
It then concluded that “[w]hat § 365(g) does by classifying rejection as
breach is establish that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights
remain in place.” 131 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it created a circuit-split but reasoned that “[b]ecause the trustee’s rejection of Lakewood’s
contract with CAM did not abrogate CAM’s contractual rights, this adversary proceeding properly ended with a judgment in CAM’s favor.” 132

B. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC
The circuit split regarding what to do with a trademark license remained until the Supreme Court decided Mission. But before the issue
reached the Supreme Court, the bankruptcy court in 2015 decided that a licensor’s bankruptcy rejection of a trademark agreement terminates the licensee’s right to continue using the trademark. 133 The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel, (“BAP”) then reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding. 134 The BAP
decision was next appealed to the First Circuit, which reinstated the

130. Id. at 376–77.
131. Id. at 377.
132. Id. at 378.
133. In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015).
134. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 825 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). A Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel, or “BAP,” is an appellate court that hears appeals from a bankruptcy court. Not
every circuit has a BAP, and, for those that do, an appellant has a choice of appealing a bankruptcy
court decision to either a district court judge or the circuit’s BAP. A BAP is composed of three
bankruptcy court judges, and a BAP decision gets appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. From
the Circuit Court of Appeals, a decision gets appealed to the US Supreme Court. What is a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel?, U.S. CTS.: NEWS (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2012
/11/26/court-insider-what-bankruptcy-appellate-panel [https://perma.cc/AE67-JDCU].
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bankruptcy court’s decision. 135 Notably, the First Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision, thereby deepening the circuit split. 136

1. Case Background and The Bankruptcy Court Decision
Tempnology, LLC was the creator of a chemical free fabric designed
to keep wearers cool during exercise. 137 Tempnology manufactured its
clothing and accessories under the brand name “Coolcore.” 138 Tempnology
entered into an agreement with Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (“Mission”). 139 The agreement provided Mission with certain rights, one of which
was “a non-exclusive license” to use the Coolcore trademarks in the United
States and around the world. 140
Tempnology then filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and attempted
to reject the license agreement. 141 At the time, a minority of courts held that
“‘Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to exercise their equitable powers
to decide, on a case by case basis, whether trademark licensees may retain
the rights listed under § 365(n).’” 142 However, the bankruptcy court held
that “the omission of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property
in § 101(35A) indicates that Congress did not intend for them to be treated
the same as the six identified categories,” and therefore, Mission’s rights to
Tempnology’s trademarks and logos were terminated post-rejection. 143 The
bankruptcy court reasoned that most courts follow the “negative inference
that
the
omission
of
trademarks
from §
101(35A) means
135. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 405 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom.; Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
136. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 404.
137. Id. at 392.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 393.
141. Id. at 394.
142. In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015) (quoting In re Crumbs
Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. at 772); see also In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro,
J., concurring).
143. In re Tempnology, LLC, 541 B.R. at 8.
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that Lubrizol’s holding was not overruled with respect to trademark licenses
and those rights are not afforded any protection under § 365(n).” 144

2. The BAP Decision
Mission appealed from the bankruptcy court’s decision, and the BAP
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 145 While the BAP agreed with the
bankruptcy court’s holding that “section 365(n) failed to protect Mission’s
rights to [Tempnology’s] trademarks, it disagreed as to the effect of that conclusion.” 146 The BAP reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding that rejection
of the executory contract extinguished the licensee’s rights. 147 The panel
instead followed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Sunbeam that rejection does
not terminate a licensee’s rights to use the trademark. 148 The BAP reasoned
that the rejection was in effect a breach of contract, which “does not necessarily terminate a licensee’s rights” under nonbankruptcy law and similarly,
under section 365(g) such rejection “likewise does not necessarily eliminate
those rights.” 149 Accordingly, the BAP “reversed the bankruptcy court’s determination that Mission no longer had protectable rights in [Tempnology’s]
trademarks.” 150

3. The First Circuit Decision
The BAP decision was appealed again and the First Circuit held that
Mission’s rights to use Tempnology’s trademarks did not survive rejection. 151 The First Circuit based its decision on Congress’s supposedly
144. Id. at 7; see e.g., In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In
re Dynamic Tooling Sys., Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 856 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660,
674–75 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
145. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 825 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).
146. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 395.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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intentional decision to exclude “trademarks” from the list of “intellectual
property eligible for the protection of section 365(n),” especially since “relatively obscure property” like “‘mask work protected under chapter 9 of title
17’” is included on the list. 152 The First Circuit also reasoned that because
there is no “catchall or residual clause” it is not even plausible to infer the
encompassment of forms of intellectual property other than those explicitly
listed. 153
While the First Circuit acknowledged Sunbeam, it declined to follow
in the Seventh Circuit’s footsteps on the grounds that “Congress’s principal
aim in providing for rejection was to ‘release the debtor’s estate from burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.’” 154 First
Circuit Judge Torruella, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the BAP was
“correct to follow the Seventh Circuit[]” in holding that a debtor’s rejection
of a trademark license agreement “should be guided by the terms of the
Agreement, and non-bankruptcy law, to determine the appropriate equitable
remedy of the functional breach of contract.” 155 He referred to the Senate
Report to explain the purposeful omission of trademarks from section
365(g). 156 Judge Torruella contended that the omission was not intended to
leave trademark licensees without protection, but rather to “allow more time
to study.” 157 He quoted the relevant portion of the Senate Report which provides:
[T]he bill does not address the rejection of executory trademark[s]
. . . While such rejection is of concern because of the interpretation of [§] 365 by the Lubrizol court and others, . . . such contracts
raise issues beyond the scope of this legislation. In particular,
trademark . . . relationships depend to a large extent on control of
the quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. Since
these matters could not be addressed without more extensive
study, it was determined to postpone congressional action in this
152. Id. at 401.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 402 (citing Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528).
155. Id. at 407.
156. Id. at 406.
157. Id. (citing Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375).
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area and to allow the development of equitable treatment of this
situation by bankruptcy courts. 158
This language seems to suggest that trademarks should not be in the same
basket as other types of intellectual property. The excerpt from the Senate
Report also undermines the holding in Mission, suggesting that it was incorrectly decided because there are so many differences between trademarks
and other types of intellectual property, such as patents and copyrights. Further, Judge Torruella argued that the majority decision “makes bankruptcy
more a sword than a shield, putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they
often do not deserve.” 159 Additionally, he argued that the majority effectively took the role of the legislature “through the creation of bright-line rules
in the face of congressional intent” when concluding that a “section 365(a)
rejection eliminates a licensee’s rights to the bargained-for use of a debtor’s
trademark effectively treats a debtor’s rejection as a contract cancellation,
rather than a contractual breach, putting the court at odds with legislative
intent.” 160 Therefore, the dissent suggested that Tempnology’s rejection of
the trademark license agreement with Mission should have been “guided by
the terms of the Agreement, and non-bankruptcy law, to determine the appropriate equitable remedy of the functional breach of contract.” 161

4. The Supreme Court Decision
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the debtor’s
rejection of the trademark licensing agreement could not revoke the license
and did not “deprive[] the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.” 162
Therefore, in the event of bankruptcy, the licensee has the option to assert
damages or continue use of the mark. 163 The Supreme Court reasoned that
under 11 U.S.C. § 365, a “debtor’s rejection of an executory contract in
bankruptcy ha[d] the same effect as a breach outside bankruptcy[,]” and thus,
158. Id. (citing S. REP. NO., 100-505, at 4–5).
159. Id. at 407; In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 967–68 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring).
160. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 407.
161. Id.
162. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1657–58 (2019).
163. Id. at 1659.
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“[s]uch an act could not rescind rights that the contract previously
granted.” 164 As a result of such a breach, “the debtor and counterparty do
not go back to their pre-contract positions,” but rather, “the counterparty retains the rights it has received under the agreement,” 165 meaning that licensees can either assert damages arising from rejection of the contract or continue to use the mark post-rejection. The Supreme Court noted that its
holding is consistent with what happens in other contexts under section
365. 166 It offered as an example section 365(h), which provides that in the
event a landlord files for bankruptcy and rejects a current lease, the tenant is
not forced to move out but may continue to live and pay rent until the conclusion of the lease term. 167
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that “[t]he Court
does not decide that every trademark licensee has the unfettered right to continue using licensed marks postrejection.” 168 The question of “whether the
licensee’s rights would survive a breach under applicable non-bankruptcy
law” remains. 169 For example, within trademark law, issues such as naked
licensing and consumer confusion could arise out of the majority decision.
As will be explored below, these issues could be resolved either by contract
or amendment of the current law. 170

164. Id. at 1666.
165. Id. at 1662.
166. Id. at 1663.
167. Id. at 1659; 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2018) (providing that “If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which the debtor is the lessor and— (i) if the rejection by the
trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by
virtue of its terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by the lessee, then the
lessee under such lease may treat such lease as terminated by the rejection; or (ii) if the term of
such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights under such lease (including rights such
as those relating to the amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable by the
lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation)
that are in or appurtenant to the real property for the balance the term of such lease and for any
renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.”).
168. Mission, 139 S. Ct. at 1666.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1667. The dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch argued that the court’s jurisdiction was in doubt so he would decline to proceed on the merits. He also reasoned that the issue
was moot because “after the bankruptcy court ruled, the license agreement expired by its own terms
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IV. ANALYSIS
While the Supreme Court decision in Mission attempted to resolve confusion among the circuits and provide clarity for parties to licensing agreements where the licensor files for bankruptcy, there are several unexplored
repercussions. For instance, as Justice Kagan noted in the majority opinion,
the decision could create difficulty in the reorganization of trademark licensors. 171 Such a difficulty could lead to an inability to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and a potential dissolution of the company
altogether. The decision also presents issues under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code as the fate of the mark is unclear when sold at a bankruptcy
auction due to concerns of naked licensing and/or consumer confusion.172
As is proposed later in this section, potential solutions include additions or
modifications to standard contract provisions as well as amendments to the
Lanham Act and/or the Bankruptcy Code to ameliorate some of the negative
aftereffects of the decision.

A. Increased Difficulty in Reorganization of Trademark Licensors
Mission held that “in the event that a bankrupt licensor rejects an intellectual property license, section 365(n) allows a licensee to retain its licensed
rights—along with its duties—absent any obligations owed by the debtorlicensor.” 173 This holding however, did not take into account the probability
that a lack of adequate quality control may result when the debtor-licensor is
relieved of its obligations under the agreement.
In Mission, Tempnology argued that a reorganizing licensor would
have to make a choice between expending scarce resources on quality control
and risking the loss of a valuable asset at the hands of naked licensing. 174 If
a debtor-licensor is no longer able to engage in “quality control,” the license
so nothing [the court] might say here could restore Mission’s ability to use Tempnology’s trademarks.
171. Id. at 1666.
172. See generally Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 66; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018);
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:4 (5th
ed. 2020).
173. In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 816 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (citing In re Exide
Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring)).
174. Mission, 139 S. Ct. at 1665.
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will become a “naked” license 175 If naked licensing occurs, the licensee may
still be able to use the mark, but as could anyone else, making the debtor
company less valuable. 176 Such a choice makes reorganization more difficult.
While Justice Kagan acknowledged that the decision might impede a
trademark licensor’s ability to reorganize, she explained that this concern is
trademark specific and not supported by section 365. 177 Even if unsupported
by section 365, the issue of increased difficulty of reorganization for trademark licensors remains a possibility.
The First Circuit in Mission pointed out that “the approach taken
by Sunbeam entirely ignores the residual enforcement burden it would impose on the debtor just as the Code otherwise allows the debtor to free itself
from executory burdens.” 178 As previously noted, one residual burden arises
if the debtor-licensor is required to spend money to maintain the quality of
the trademark. Expending funds in bankruptcy to maintain the quality of a
trademark creates difficulty for the debtor-licensor because there would necessarily be less money to distribute to other creditors. If this is the case,
creditors will be less likely to vote to approve the debtor’s bankruptcy
plan. 179 Accordingly, it will be difficult for the debtor to get a discharge,
which is in direct contravention with the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of providing a fresh start to debtors. 180 “As the full measure of a debtor’s fresh start
flowing from the bankruptcy is vital to Congress’ mission in enacting the
Bankruptcy Code, anything which would frustrate the mission must be scrutinized carefully.” 181

175. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07; 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON
TRADEMARKS § 3.10 (2020).
176. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 175, § 3.10.
177. Mission, 139 S. Ct. at 1665.
178. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2018); Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.
180. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.
181. Cherise M. Wolas, Is the Debtor Left Standing When the Music Stops: Assumption and
Rejection of Executory Recording Contracts by Insolvent Musicians, 9 LOY. ENT. L.J. 259, 282
(1989).
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The Intellectual Property Owners Association (“IPOA”), in its Amicus
Brief to the Supreme Court, argued that the Court of Appeals overstated the
meaning of quality control when considering the effects of the ability of the
licensee to continue use of the mark, however, it acknowledged that quality
control obligations could be quite burdensome. 182 The IPOA further argued
that “‘[o]nly minimal quality control’ is typically needed to avoid these consequences.” 183 However, the IPOA went on to explain that “[j]ust as important, adequate quality control ‘varies with the circumstances.’” 184 It
acknowledged the importance of consideration of the “type of goods or services being licensed.” 185 For instance, “consumers may expect greater quality consistency from a restaurant franchise than they expect from licensed
merchandise for their favorite sports team.” 186
The IPOA made the concession that “some licensing arrangements may
require a level or type of quality control that impedes the debtor-licensor
from successfully reorganizing.” 187 It argued that “‘there are already incentives for licensees to maintain the licensor’s quality control provisions’ even
where the licensor files a bankruptcy petition.” 188 However, as explained
above, this usually is not enough to maintain quality unless the licensor and
licensee enjoy a special relationship.
Additionally, if a plan is not approved by the creditors under Chapter
11, the company may be forced to convert the case to Chapter 7, requiring a
winding up of affairs, a sale of assets, and ultimately dissolution. 189 A
182. Brief of the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at *15–16, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. vs Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S 397 (2018)
(No. 17-1657).
183. Id. at *13; Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).
184. Brief of the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 182, at *14; Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.East., 542 F.2d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 1976).
185. Brief of the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 182, at *14.
186. Id. at *14–15.
187. Id. at *26.
188. Id. at *16.
189. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.
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Chapter 11 debtor chooses to file under Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7 in
order to remain in business and survive the bankruptcy process. 190 If the
debtor company cannot get a plan approved, the company may not survive
and the business impact could be catastrophic. 191 Conversion under Chapter
7 means that employees would lose their jobs and stockholders would likely
lose their investments since they are considered low priority creditors. 192
For example, Circuit City, a “superstore,” faced an inability to compete
with popular stores like Best Buy, Home Depot, and Lowes, and filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2008 with the hopes of reorganizing to reduce costs
and increase profitability. 193 Because Circuit City could not meet the requirements of the plan set by the court and its creditors, the company converted the case under Chapter 7 and began to close all of its stores. 194 Circuit
City’s assets, along with its trademarks, were liquidated and sold at auction. 195 While Circuit City’s assets were purchased in 2009 by a company
called Systemax, it was not until 2018 that the company was revived, and
revival is not a possibility for all companies that file for bankruptcy. 196
As Circuit City’s case illustrates, the Chapter 11 debtor’s chance at a
fresh start and continued existence hinge on the ability to get a plan approved. While there were no issues of quality control in Circuit City’s case,
committing to engage in quality control under Chapter 11 may allow the
mark to survive temporarily. However, it is still possible that the case could
be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, and such efforts to keep the trademark alive could work to the company’s detriment by impeding its
190. Id.
191. Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77; 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2018).
192. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
193. See Karen Jacobs, Circuit City Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2008),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-circuitcity/circuit-city-files-for-bankruptcyidUSTRE4A936V20081111 [https://perma.cc/GD57-ULQ5].
194. Karen Jacobs et al., Circuit City to Liquidate, Shutter Stores, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2009),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-circuitcity/circuit-city-to-liquidate-shutter-storesidUSTRE50F1VW20090116 [https://perma.cc/WB3A-W2K8].
195. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS: A GLOBAL AND LOCAL
OUTLOOK § 7.29 (Irene Calboli & Jacques De Werra eds., 2016).
196. Lauren Thomas, Circuit City to Relaunch Online Next Month, with Stores on the Horizon, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/09/circuit-city-to-relaunchonline-next-month-with-stores-on-the-horizon.html [https://perma.cc/8AK7-QM95].
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reorganization and forcing a wind up. While a conversion and forced wind
up may not always be the case, particularly if the costs of engaging in quality
control are low, as further discussed below, possible solutions in this scenario include placing a provision in the contract that allows the debtor-licensor to reject the trademark license while simultaneously cutting off the licensee’s right to use the trademark. However, this option has repercussions for
licensees, particularly if they have invested time and money building their
business around use of the trademark.
Alternatively, if there are quality control measures in place by the purchaser, the trademark may survive. 197 A solution to this would include putting a provision in the contract providing that in the event of bankruptcy of
the licensor, the licensee would become the owner of the trademark. However, a problem arises under this solution where the license is a non-exclusive license, meaning that others also have the right to use the mark. 198 For
example, if Coca-Cola filed for bankruptcy, and it had executed a license of
its word mark to a diner and a small manufacturer of apparel, and the mark
survived bankruptcy, there would be an increased likelihood of consumer
confusion because consumers would not know where the mark originated,
and therefore, the source of the mark would be distorted.
Even when the license is exclusive, if the licensor and licensee’s businesses are different, it may be impermissible to assign the mark to the licensee. 199 Such an assignment would be to sell the mark separate from the underlying product or service, which directly violates the rule against
assignments in gross. 200 Even if a trademark assignment “expressly assigns
the goodwill associated with the trademark, the assignment may be ineffective if the assignee’s products are not nearly the same as the assignor’s
goods.” 201 Such a rule ensures “both continuity of type of goods and quality

197. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07; see also Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., 289 F.3d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 2002).
198. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.03 (2020).
199. Scott D. Locke and Jessica J. Kastner, Violation of the Assignment-In-Gross Rule for
Trademarks, LAW.COM, N.Y. L.J. (June 30, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://www.law.com
/newyorklawjournal/2020/06/30/violation-of-the-assignment-in-gross-rule-for-trademarks/?slreturn=20200927230217 [https://perma.cc/X5QT-KEAD].
200. Id.
201. Id.
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under the assigned trademark.” 202 However, if the licensor and licensee have
similar businesses then such a solution may work. 203
Notwithstanding permissibility, there may be scenarios where it does
not make sense for a licensee to become the new owner of the trademark
after bankruptcy of the licensor. In the Coca-Cola illustration above, if CocaCola filed for bankruptcy, it would make little sense for its valuable trademark to transfer to the owner of the small apparel manufacturing company.
Not only will the mark no longer be backed by the original trademark owner,
losing its identification as to its source, but some licensees may lack the negotiating power to get such a provision into a contract due to their inferior
bargaining position. Thus, while assignment of ownership to the licensee
upon bankruptcy of the licensor is possible in some scenarios, it may not
always be a viable solution.
The policy behind the law against naked licensing focuses on protection from consumer confusion, promotion of fair competition, and protection
of goodwill. 204 Allowing trademark licensees to continue use of a trademark
after the licensor has filed for bankruptcy may give rise to consumer confusion because the source of the goods or services at issue may be distorted if
a debtor no longer has the ability to supervise a licensee’s use of a mark. 205
This option may violate the underlying policy of trademark law, which is
rooted in the “public’s interest in not being misled as to the origin and quality
of goods that consumers buy.” 206 Whether a lack of quality control comes
from the reorganization, dissolution, or sale of a company, the potential for
abandonment as a result of naked licensing lingers because trademark owners are obligated “to control the quality of goods or services provided under
the licensed trademark.” 207

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2020).
205. Id.; Smith, supra note 79, at 290.
206. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
207. Tom Kulik, Leaving a Mark II: Why Trademark Licensees Need to Beware the Holding in Mission Products Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, ABOVE THE LAW (June 10, 2019, 4:48
PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/06/leaving-a-mark-ii-why-trademark-licensees-need-to-beware-the-holding-in-mission-products-holdings-v-tempnology-llc/ [http://archive.today/hR17t].
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B. Amendment of the Lanham Act
A possible solution to the loss of the of trademark rights where there is
a lack of quality control by the licensor is a congressional amendment of the
Lanham Act to include an exception in the event a trademark licensor files
for bankruptcy. Such a provision could state: “In context of bankruptcy, licensees will maintain the right to use the mark irrespective of supervision or
lack thereof, for a specified period so long as the licensee maintains the quality of the products or services.” This specific carve-out will provide more
latitude to a licensee in the event that the licensor files for bankruptcy, allowing the mark to survive the bankruptcy and alleviate some of the risk that
arises out of the Mission decision. This exception would also coincide with
trademark policy because if equivalent quality is maintained, the mark will
continue to serve as a source identifier, protect goodwill, avoid consumer
confusion, and promote fair competition. 208
Further, the exception could include an additional time limit that begins
to run at the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition in order to prevent an
unfair disadvantage to the licensee. Currently, under the Lanham Act, the
presumption of abandonment arises after three consecutive years of nonuse. 209 In 1996, Congress amended the code to expand the time limit to three
years rather than the two years of nonuse. 210 This legislative history indicates that there came a point when two years was deemed insufficient, possibly justifying an additional time period in the context of bankruptcy. An
additional time limit will allow licensees who may have expended a significant amount of funds in connection with the sale and marketing of their products the time to plan and begin thinking about other options.
However, in the event of Chapter 7 liquidation, it is unclear whether
the mark would survive. This uncertainty lies in the fact that the asset may
either be purchased or abandoned. 211 In the scenario where the company
dissolves and the licensor’s rights under the agreement are sold at auction,

208. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 204, § 1.03.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
210. Sandra Edelman, Why Wait Three Years? Cancellation of Lanham Act Section 44(e)
and 66(a) Registrations Based on Non-Use Prior to the Three-Year Statutory Period for Presumption of Abandonment, 104 THE TRADEMARK ASS’N 1366, 1372 n.29 (2014).
211. Process - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 6.
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the mark may become abandoned if there is a lack of quality control by the
new purchaser. 212

C. The Best Option to Overcome the Issues with the Mission
Decision
As previously noted, in bankruptcy, the core policy is to help the unfortunate but honest debtor achieve its fresh start. 213 In trademark law, the
core policies are to ensure consumer recognition as to the source of goods
and services, to promote fair competition, and to protect the goodwill of the
business. 214 However, these policies have been undermined by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Mission. To achieve a result in line with the policies underlying both trademark law and bankruptcy law, Congress will need to override and fix the holding in Mission. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, the
impact of the decision on restructuring licensors may be significant, but that
impact did not alter the outcome of the case. 215 Rather, the Supreme Court
left “Congress with the option to tailor a provision for trademark licenses, as
it has repeatedly in other contexts.” 216

D. Advice to Practitioners
In the absence of a congressional response to Mission, attorneys of licensors could negotiate termination rights in the event the licensor files for
bankruptcy causing “contract law principles . . . [to] determine the parties’
respective rights.” 217 To illustrate, licensors may try to contract around the
decision by inserting a provision that includes language as simple as: “in the
event the Licensor files bankruptcy and rejects the trademark licensing
agreement, the Licensee’s right to continued use of the trademark will
212. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 13, § 6.07.
213. See discussion supra Part II.B.
214. GILSON LALONDE, supra note 204, § 1.03.
215. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1667 (2019) (Sotomayor, concurring).
216. Id.
217. Michael J. Kasdan, Sapna W. Palla & Kristyn Hansen, In Landmark Decision, Supreme Court Rules Trademark Licensees Retain Rights Even After Rejection by Licensor in Bankruptcy, NAT’L L. REV. (May 28, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/landmark-decisionsupreme-court-rules-trademark-licensees-retain-rights-even-after [https://perma.cc/T7P9-AU26].
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terminate upon rejection.” As noted above, such a provision could be the
difference between a debtor-licensor surviving bankruptcy and not surviving.
Indeed, a contract provision such as the one above would let a licensor
terminate a licensing agreement upon filing bankruptcy, which could reduce
its quality control obligations and potentially allow the licensor to renegotiate the licensing agreement or find a new licensee. The reduction of quality
control obligations would free up precious resources to allocate to creditors
under a Chapter 11 plan. The potential renegotiation of the licensing agreement would give the debtor the chance to possibly bring more money into
the estate, which could also be used to repay creditors. This termination
would therefore allow the debtor to propose a Chapter 11 plan that would
allocate more money to creditors and would be more likely to get approved
through the voting process. Such a provision would likely put the licensee
in a position to negotiate for a lesser royalty rate to alleviate the risk of a
potential bankruptcy by the licensor.
In the absence of such contract provisions, debtors would have less
money to allocate to creditors, making plan rejection and conversion to
Chapter 7 more likely in instances where the debtor may not have enough
funds to get a plan confirmed. 218 Conversion would be disastrous to the
Chapter 11 debtor because it would result in the cessation of the debtor’s
business. Licensors’ attorneys therefore need to be aware of the downstream
risk to their clients if such provisions are not negotiated—leaving the Mission holding intact could make the difference between the client’s survival
and dissolution. Courts should be willing to uphold such provisions to provide licensors a better chance to reorganize and survive bankruptcy.
Another reason that courts should help debtors reorganize is that creditors must either accept a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan or receive at least as much
money under the Chapter 11 plan as they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation. 219 Because creditors will often receive more under a Chapter 11 reorganization than they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation—and never less—
it is in the interest of creditors for the debtor to be able to reorganize. 220

218. See generally Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 77.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2018).
220. Id.
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However, while it has been argued that “monetary damages for breach
are more than sufficient remedies for Mission under § 365,” 221 the option to
continue use of the trademark may be important because claims made against
a bankruptcy estate are often paid only cents on the dollar, “making it likely
that a continuing license is far more valuable to the licensee.” 222 In fact, it is
possible that the licensee might not be entitled to any payment at all. 223
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the creditors are grouped into classes
and ordered in terms of priority. 224 For example, in corporate bankruptcies,
attorneys and other professionals are priority “administrative expense claimants” under section 507(a)(2) and will get paid in full before all other creditors. 225 Unsecured trademark licensees are non-priority creditors that are
paid only after priority creditors have been paid in full. 226
As an alternative to a provision allowing a licensor to terminate a licensee’s rights to use a mark upon the licensor’s bankruptcy filing, the contract could contain a term which provides that a licensor be required to provide a written commitment to continue to maintain quality control or to
“agree to assign the trademark (and any registration) to the licensee” upon
insolvency of the licensor. 227 A licensing agreement could also require that

221. Smith, supra note 79, at 303.
222. In Mission Product Ruling, Supreme Court Clarifies Longstanding Circuit Split on
Effects of Bankruptcy on Trademark Licenses, IPWATCHDOG (May 20, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/20/mission-product-ruling-supreme-court-clarifies-longstanding-circuitsplit-effects-bankruptcy-trademark-licenses/id=109440/ [https://perma.cc/79J5-7G4N].
223. Id.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (stating that “(a) [t]he following expenses and claims have priority in
the following order: (1) First (A) Allowed unsecured claims for domestic support obligations . . .
(C) If a trustee is appointed . . . the administrative expenses of the trustee . . . (2) Second, administrative expenses[,] . . . unsecured claims of any Federal reserve bank[,] . . . and any fees and
charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28. (3) Third, unsecured claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title. (4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims, but only to the extent
of $10,000 for each individual or corporation . . . for— (A) wages, salaries, or commissions . . . or
(B) sales commissions earned by an individual or by a corporation with only 1 employee, acting as
an independent contractor in the sale of goods or services for the debtor in the ordinary course of
the debtor’s business . . . .”).
225. Id.
226. Id.
marks

227. Milton Springut, Supreme Court Bankruptcy Decision Has Major Impact on Tradeand Licenses, LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.law.com
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“if the licensor cannot commit to doing so, the licensor would appoint the
licensee as its agent to file renewals with the Trademark Office and fees incurred deducted from any royalties due[,]” and the licensee will maintain
quality. 228 This may give the licensor the opportunity to eliminate expensive
obligations and allow the licensee to continue using the mark.
Nonetheless, in light of the potential for consumer confusion and naked
licensing resulting from a lack of supervision post-bankruptcy, the decision
in Mission, “[a]s a practical matter, [] may lead to higher licensing fees to
account for the greater risk on the part of the licensor.” 229 Attorneys of licensors may also try to push for agreements with shorter terms to prevent
“further degradation of the debtor’s fresh start options” in the event that a
licensor becomes obligated, upon filing bankruptcy, to expend scarce financial resources to maintain the quality of the mark for an extended period of
time. 230 For now, attorneys for parties to a licensing agreement must be
aware of the bankruptcy implications of the Mission holding and prepare to
address them in contract negotiations to give their clients the best possible
representation.

V. CONCLUSION
While the Mission decision is seemingly licensee friendly, there are
several undesirable results that arise out of the decision, which include an
undermining of the twin aims of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the likelihood of consumer confusion, naked licensing, abandonment, and even dissolution of the debtor. Consequently, it is crucial that practitioners remain
aware of the potential effect that could result from Mission. As noted above,
the case may have tremendous implications for reorganizing licensors. Attorneys for trademark licensors should try to negotiate for provisions in
trademark licensing agreements, such as termination of a licensee’s right to
use the mark, in order to contract around the holding in Mission (to the extent
/newyorklawjournal/2019/06/12/supreme-court-bankruptcy-decision-has-major-impact-on-trademarks-and-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/TCD7-YJHS].
228. Id.
229. Anthony J. Dreyer et al., US Supreme Court Holds That Bankrupt Companies Cannot
Rescind Trademark Licenses, SKADDEN (May 21, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/05/us-supreme-court-holds-that-bankrupt-companies
[https://perma.cc/PU5VHP5M].
230. In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 404 (1st Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
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this is permissible). Attorneys for trademark licensees should try to ensure
that their clients get something in return for such provisions to create a mutually beneficial bargain, such as a lower royalty rate to account for the risk
of loss. If the parties do not agree to such a provision, or if such a provision
is unenforceable, then the licensee will be able to continue using the trademark, even upon the licensor’s rejection of the agreement in bankruptcy,
which may open the doors for the problems set forth above.
In the absence of such provisions, congressional intervention will likely
be necessary. 231 Otherwise, the twin aims of the Code will not be met with
regard to trademark licensing agreements, companies could be wound up,
employees could lose their jobs, and investors could lose their investments.
Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code by adding a trademark-specific
provision as suggested by Justice Sotomayor. Alternatively, Congress could
amend the Lanham Act to include an exception to the rule regarding naked
licensing in the context of bankruptcy. For now, congressional intervention
of the bankruptcy and trademark codes may be premature.
While there is still no perfect solution or ideal rule for both licensors
and licensees for now, if practitioners—especially those who represent trademark licensors—remain aware of the issues discussed in this Comment, and
negotiate prudently, they will be able to craft a mutually beneficial agreement for their clients that avoids the dangers created by Mission.

231. Menell, supra note 72, at 754 (2007) (“[S]ection 365(e)(1) invalidates any termination
or modification clause of an executory contract (or lease) conditioned upon the insolvency or financial condition of a debtor, the filing of a bankruptcy petition, or the appointment of a bankruptcy
trustee.”); see 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2018). But see F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, An Approach
to Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate Control, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1313, 1313-1314
(2004) (“proposing use of special purpose entities for holding IP assets to exclude them from bankruptcy estates”).

